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ABSTRACT 
The institutional arrangements, such as the property private order, market, law and other 
social institutions, governance, cannot function without certain costs. Such costs are not 
generally or necessarily measurable, but their identification helps understanding how the 
economic activity is organised and, therefore, appropriately explaining its performances. 
The study illustrates the fundamental theoretical research on the issue of transaction costs, 
as  reflected  in  the  institutional  analysis  entitled  “Transaction  Costs  Economics”.  The 
inherent connection between the transaction costs and the entrepreneurial activity indicates 
the  need  to  restate  and  extend  the  neoclassical  approach.  The  argument  calls  up  the 
institutional context of the property rights, which are in fact decisive for the manifestation 
of entrepreneurship. The restatement of the approach relates to knowing the fact that the 
property  rights  and  the  transaction  costs  influence  the  entrepreneurial  activity  and, 
therefore, the overall economic performances.  
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1. PREAMBLE 
In the economic approach of institutions of Douglass North, recipient of the 1993 Nobel 
prize, the theory of institutions “is constructed from a theory of human behaviour combined 
with a theory of the costs of transacting” (North, 1990, p.27). By combining these theories, 
one can understand why institutions exist and what role they play in the development of the 
society. North also mentions that if you add the theory of production, one can analyze the 
institutions implication over the economic performance. The author mentions afterwards 
that if the theory of production is added, then the institutions’ implication in the economic 
performances may be analysed. 
 
Transaction costs would represent, to this effect, the major “plot” of the entire research 
project and the field to be analysed meant to give operational value to the manner the 
institutions succeed to give force to economic development. Besides, the following chapters 
hereof are meant to present a theoretical analysis of and to empirically operationalise the 
transaction  costs.  The  essential  purpose  consists  in  evaluating  the  practicability  of  the 
transaction  costs  as  a  specific  indicator  of  assessing  the  quality  of  the  institutional 
arrangements. Contrary to the mainstream approach in the transaction costs economy, I will 
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try  to  show  that  the  logical  line  of  the  approach  is  in  general  “from  institutions  to 
transaction costs”, which makes the “transaction costs” phenomenon become the efficiency 
factor for any institutional arrangement that burdens the operation of economic activity. 
 
The main thesis of the “institutional economy” of transaction costs concerns the sense and 
the  interpenetration  degree  of  the  cause  and  effect  matrix  in  the  relation  institutions-
transaction costs. The transaction costs pertinent for the economic performance have their 
own institutional “anchors”. That is why, any strategy for institutional reform and change, 
non-contradictory  and  sustainable,  has  to  focus  on  the  ultimate  cases  –  institutions, 
respectively transaction costs - when the transaction costs’ control and reduction show the 
practicability of changing the institutional arrangement. 
 
2. TRANSACTION COSTS AS INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR  
Even if in the specialty literature, from a conceptual and methodological point of view, 
there are no general approaches of transaction costs, the empirical challenges are very up-
to-date, with an actual potential to clarify the field of institutional reform. To this effect, 
various pragmatic studies on transaction costs may be invoked, as these are relevant from 
the point of view of the operationalisation and quantitative assessment: Allen (1999), Foss 
(2006), Kang (2001), Meyer (2001), Păun (2010), Shelanski (1995), Wang (2003, 1999), 
Williamson (2011, 2010) etc. But, in order to have an adequate integration of transaction 
costs in the analysis of the institutional factor’s quality, the approach must distinguish – 
following the line of the previous conceptual clarifications – between diverse institutional 
systems that are categorically different in the logics of their own operation mechanisms. 
From  such  perspective  we  may  distinguish  between  two  large  institutional  systems, 
respectively two approaches of the transaction costs: 
 
Transaction costs at economic level would represent a real criterion for optimisation, as 
long as “the transactional argument” is inherent part of the economic calculation’s logics. 
At economic plan, the empirical approach is related to the estimation of the importance that 
the transaction costs have for the performances of the business environment in Romania 
and other countries in European Union. Methodologically speaking, the pragmatic analysis 
will be based on the assessment of the transaction costs which are correlated with certain 
indicators  of  the  governance  and  of  the  institutional  capacity  (such  as  indicators  of 
corruption,  of  underground  economy,  of  the  business  environment’s  competitiveness), 
under  a  cross-country  analysis  meant  to  identify  the  institutional  constraints  over  the 
entrepreneurship and over the economic activity in general. 
Transaction  costs  at  political  and  administrative  plan  would  reflect,  as  paraphrase  of 
Coase’s generic terms, the costs for the operation of the political and administrative system. 
In  the  democratic  political  system,  the  collective  decision  is  the  result  of  the  complex 
interactions among citizens, in their capacity as voters, consumers of public goods, elected 
representatives  and  State  employees,  leaders  and  members  of  political  parties.  By 
definition, the democratic political process is the equivalent to the existence of different 
electoral coalitions. In the specialty literature – Public Choice Theory – their manifestation 
is  designated  using  specific  concepts,  such  as  rent-seeking,  political  lobby,  groups  of 
interests,  State  capture.  Olson  (1999:101)  shows  how  “the  more  and  more  complex 
regulations resulting from the lobby … increase the level of bureaucracy and the role of 
Government”. And in front of such complex regulations resulted from the activity of the Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 15, Issue 2, 2012 
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interest groups, an entire – economic and legal – arsenal is developed meant to exploit the 
nature of regulations or to minimise the costs of their enforcement. It is obvious that the 
operation  of  the  democratic  political  institutions  entails  transaction  costs  the  extent  of 
which is decisive for the success of the institutional reforms and changes. 
3. “THE ISSUE OF MEASURING” THE TRANSACTION COSTS 
Generally  speaking,  the  economists  include  in  the  category  of  transaction  costs  all  the 
efforts  for  information,  the  costs  of  negotiating  and  drafting  contracts,  the  costs  of 
protecting  the  ownership  rights  and  imposing  rules  and  agreements  under  various 
contractual arrangements. For example, North (1990, p. 27) states that the costly nature of 
information is the key of the transaction costs, which would thus consists in “the cost of 
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being changed and the costs of protecting the 
rights and of imposing contractual agreements”.  
 
But the issue of “measuring the valuable attributes of what is being changed” reveals the 
objectivistic perspective used by North to build his theory. But, as indicated in the book 
Instituţii şi prosperitate (2003), the subjectivism paradigm, which substantiates the whole 
modern theory of value, excludes the possibility to externally and objectively assess the 
costs  of  human  action.  In  relation  to  this  issue,  the  essential  difficulty  occurs  of 
operationalizing the transaction costs at an empirical level, by their measurement. As how 
could  the  economist  express  and  measure  what  not  even  the  persons  involved  in 
transactions cannot do objectively? Therefore, several difficulties exist in relation to the 
operationalisation of the transaction costs at an empirical level. One might say that from an 
instrumentality  point  of  view  the  transaction  costs  represent  rather  a  way  to  formulate 
arguments, than an empirical, efficiency indicator, really cognizable. 
 
In such context, I believe that the transaction costs’ economy is currently facing, maybe 
more than ever, two major challenges at the level of its empirical relevance. 
 
First of all, it is the most invoked need to “measure”, to assess the transaction costs under 
some quantitative empirical analyses, able to indicate thereafter the deterministic impact of 
the institutional variable of the transaction costs.  
 
Secondly,  it  is  about  a  more  extensive  challenge,  for  summarisation  and  thematic 
integration of the empirical researches into diverse fields of activity. The insertion of the 
transaction costs in the logics of the institutional reforms requires going  from a partial 
sector approach, of microeconomic nature, to an integrated approach, aggregated at the 
level of the entire institutional system indicating the operation of the business environment. 
 
The same empirical framework for “measurement” includes also the assessments of the 
transaction costs as an inter-country comparative approach. The criteria taken into account 
refer mainly to the costs that individuals and legal entities incur in relation to the formal 
institutional arrangement. For example, according to the studies conducted by Benham and 
Benham  (2001),  it  is  about  the  costs  in  time  and  the  money  that  people  in  different 
countries must “pay” in order to have a telephone set installed, the waiting time and the 
(legal  and  informal)  payments  necessary  to  set-up  a  company,  how  the  underground 
economy “fuels” the business operation (de Soto, 1989), as well as aspects aiming at the 
institutional structuring of business environment. Cosmin MARINESCU 
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As an aggregate approach of the transaction costs at the level of the entire economy, it 
should be detailed the attempt to measure the transaction costs made by Wallis and North 
(1986) regarding the USA economy. Their study underlined the substantial increase of the 
transaction costs during the period under analysis (1870 – 1970), the transaction costs being 
assessed at the end of that period at approximately 55% of the national income, as it was 
about  resources  allotted  in  the  “transaction  sector”.  To  this  effect,  in  a  kind  of  forced 
manner, Wallis and North associate (from the quantity point of view) the transaction costs 
with all the resources of the companies providing agency and transaction services. Such 
confusion between the transaction sector and the transaction costs entailed several critical 
approaches regarding the relevance of “measuring” the transaction costs. 
 
However, the entire empirical approach of the transaction costs is built in extension of a 
simple idea, which was gradually brought up to the level of a scientific postulate: economic 
performance depends on low transaction costs. Such “theorem”, apparently sufficient per 
se, is though raising the issue of its own empirical consistency. If “low transaction costs” 
mean complete freedom of the resources’ owners to orient their resources according to the 
most valuable uses, those uses which are according to their subjective assessments, then the 
“postulate” may fully affirm its empirical consistency based on assessments focused on the 
economic  freedom’s  problems.  Such  analysis  has  the  chance  to  check  the  relation 
manifested in an economy between the economic freedom and the size of the transaction 
costs (which are imposed on the market participants through various external institutions 
and  administrative  constraints  on  business).  But  if  the  authors  understand  by  “low 
transaction costs” rather the expenses needed for the transactions on the free market, then 
the issue of measurement brings additional difficulties. 
 
4. TRANSACTION COSTS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE –
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Within  the  actual  framework  of  the  economic  activity,  the  institutional  perspective  is 
explicitly complemented by the relation institutions – transaction costs, already analysed 
theoretically and methodologically. But, hereinafter, under the empirical analysis of the 
institutional determinants of the economic performance, I will present the way such relation 
institutions – transaction costs stimulates, in diverse directions and with various levels of 
intensity, the entrepreneurial activity. Besides, both the contemporary specialty literature, 
and  the  classical  one,  mention  almost  unequivocally  the  vital  importance  of 
entrepreneurship for the economic performance: Baumol (1990, 1993), Eggertsson (1990), 
Kirzner (1997), Knight (1921), Mises (1949), North (1990), Schumpeter (1934), de Soto 
(2003) etc. 
 
Therefore, the analysis of the institutional capacity of the business environment must start 
from  underlining  the  institutional  and  administrative  barriers  which  alter  the  genuine 
entrepreneurial  initiative  (Bjørnskov  &  Foss,  2008).  The  natural,  predictable  result  of 
correcting such barriers will consist in the emergency of a strong private sector, relying on 
entrepreneurial initiative and autonomously from the political power. 
 
The equation of the economic performance must though be approached and distinguished 
differently, gradually, in relation to the explanatory  factors taken into account. On one 
hand, it is the institutions role, meaning the way the institutional framework orients the Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 15, Issue 2, 2012 
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economic activity and, on the other hand, it is the transaction costs role, meaning the extent 
with which institutions burdens the entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the incentives issue and 
the economic calculation issue, used to summarise in the previous chapters the matrix of 
the economic development, will be reflected in such institutional perspective through the 
following two stages/levels of analysis: 
a)  Institutions determine the direction of the entrepreneurial activity. According 
to  the  actual  nature  of  the  institutional  system  in  reality,  through  the  structure  of  the 
incentives incorporate in its operation, institutions may orient the entrepreneurial activity 
towards a productive direction or, on the contrary, towards an unproductive direction, a 
destructive one. It is well-known the approach suggested by Baumol (1990), according to 
which entrepreneurial activity may become unproductive when, guided by the institutions 
with  State  discretionary  power,  it  is  materialised  as  activities  of  rent-seeking  and  of 
capturing  State  (policies).  In  an  economic  climate  dominated  by  State’s  discretionary 
interventions, a reorientation of the entrepreneurial behaviour takes place: the impulse to 
meet the consumers’ preferences on the market will be replaced by the need to meet the 
expectations of the administrations and political power’s structures. For example, Frederic 
Sautet (2005) identifies three categories of entrepreneurship starting from  the  nature of 
formal rules: productive (incentives directing the entrepreneurs towards socially beneficial 
activities), evasive (formal institutions offer the entrepreneurs some incentives for ignoring 
and  avoiding  the  formal  institutional  framework,  see  underground  economy).  The  third 
category  is  destructive  entrepreneurship  which  occurs  when  formal  institutions  are 
manipulated and created in a discretionary manner, fact that institutes incentives so that 
certain  entrepreneurs  exploit  the  formal  rules,  obtaining  incomes  through  political 
privileges. 
 
In  an  economy  like  Romania’s,  engraved  by  fundamental  institutional  transformations, 
specific for the transition to market economy, State and companies are connected through 
mechanisms that exceed the standard provision of insuring public assets. Thus, from an 
institutional point of view, State has the capacity to grant the companies, in a discretionary 
manner,  several  benefits:  State  financing,  licenses,  explicit  and  implicit  subsidies, 
allowance for debts towards State budget, some exemptions from fiscal obligations, various 
facilities. But the entire set of discretionary advantages is not necessarily the equivalent to 
the reduction of the burden that public sector imposes on business environment, so to the 
reduction  of  the  State’s  size  in  economy  (generally  estimated  through  the  share  of  the 
central and local public budgets into the gross domestic product). In such situation, the 
discriminatory  policies  could  get  an  attractive  nature  (Marinescu,  2004).  In  general, 
granting privileges to certain groups or sectors is finally accompanied by the increase of the 
level of State (fiscal) exploitation over the other economic groups or sectors. This situation 
creates strong incentives for the development of the behaviour needed to obtain privileges, 
meaning incentives for orienting major resources towards State capture  (see Hellman & 
Schankerman, 2000). Thus, entrepreneurs will invest in the preference of the Government 
administration to the detriment of real investments - economically productive - conceived 
to meet the consumer public’s preferences. 
 
b) Transaction  costs  determine  the  intensity  of  the  entrepreneurial  activity. 
Institutions and their evolution do not give only the direction of the entrepreneurial activity, 
either  productive  or  unproductive,  but  also  the  intensity  of  its  manifestation.  And 
entrepreneurs will be more or less intensely manifested depending on the amount of the 
transaction costs resulting from any institutional arrangement. While transaction costs on Cosmin MARINESCU 
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the  market  may  represent  real  economic  opportunities  for  the  entrepreneurial  activity, 
imposed  transaction  costs  are  certainly  explaining  the  manifestation  of  entrepreneurial 
activity in an inverse relation. The higher the transaction costs that are institutionally and 
administratively-bureaucratically  imposed  on  business  environment,  the  more 
entrepreneurial activity will be prejudiced (McMullen, Bagby & Palich, 2008). Besides the 
reason of the incentives, it is about the objective logics of reducing the capital resources 
which ensure and define, as a matter of fact, the existence of the entrepreneurial activity. 
 
The  institutional  perspective  over  the  entrepreneurship  –  transaction  costs  relation  is 
explicitly  complemented  by  arguments  which  underline,  both  methodologically  and 
empirically,  the  category  of  economic  freedom.  The  entrepreneurial  activity  may  be 
analysed only through an intrinsic, natural connexion with the institutional framework of 
economic freedom. Recent pragmatic studies expressively illustrate the importance of the 
economic freedom institutions for the manifestation of the productive entrepreneurship - 
Bjørnskov  and  Foss  (2008);  Stenholm,  Acs  &  Wuebker  (2011);  Aggestam  (2012); 
McMullen, Bagby and Palich (2008); Audretsch & Link (2012); Brunetti (2007); Sobel 
(2008); Wink, Sheng & Eid (2011); Matiş, Nagy, Petru & Benyovszki (2010). Essentially, 
the empirical approaches prove that the increase of economic freedom, by ameliorating the 
quality of the institutions and by reducing transaction costs that are imposed, stimulate the 
entrepreneurial activity and economic performance.  
 
It is generally noticed that a high and arbitrary level of taxation and regulation, along with 
legislative instability, are the main institutional deficiencies contravening the productive 
entrepreneurship.  To  this  effect,  when  such  institutional  deficiencies  prevail,  the 
entrepreneurs’ preoccupations to avoid transaction costs that are imposed (An experiment 
in Lima, Peru, conducted by a team of researchers with Instituto Libertad y Democracia 
revealed the adverse effect of bureaucracy and regulations on entrepreneurship. Thus, te 
setting-up of a small textile factory, in compliance with all legal provisions, lasted 289 
days. Five people hired with full time finally succeeded to duly set-up such an enterprise. 
The  interaction  with  the  bureaucratic  apparatus  entailed  additional  costs  consisting  in 
requests for payment of tips or bribery in order to expedite the bureaucratic procedures 
(Hernando  de  Soto,  1999)),  also  by  unofficial  payments  to  Government  bureaucracies, 
seem to be “productive” efforts. Their purpose is that entrepreneurs be able to find their 
way through the bureaucratic medley, which ultimately represents the release of certain 
resources that are under Government control. Thus, the refuge in the underground economy 
occurs as a plausible solution and, economically speaking, completely understandable. One 
should not understand that underground economy reflects the manifestation of a certain 
entrepreneurial  deficit  (Marinescu  et  al.,  2007,  p.  294).  In  reality,  the  “refuge”  in  the 
underground economy is dictated by the existence of certain fiscal costs and institutional 
constraints that significantly alter the profitability of such businss. 
In relation with the mainly macroeconomic paradigm of the Washington Consensus, the 
transition economy neglected for quite a long time the essential meaning of the institutional 
perspective, as well as the preliminary need for institutional reforms. Finally, at least as 
regards some countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, the weak performances of the 
micro  and  macroeconomic  management  are  the  consequences  of  the  institutional 
deficiencies, which is the expression of the institutional frailty. Recognising this offers the 
possibility to construe the failure of the economic reforms based on a vicious circle of the 
institutional deficits. Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 15, Issue 2, 2012 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The institutional arrangements, such as the property private order, market, law and other 
social institutions, governance, cannot function without certain costs. Such costs are not 
generally or necessarily measurable, but their identification helps understanding how the 
economic activity is organised and, therefore, appropriately explaining its performances. 
 
In  the  conventional  approach  (mainstream)  of  the  transaction  costs,  the  institutional 
ingredient  of  low  transaction  costs  seemed  to  represent  the  key  for  the  economic 
development. But any  strategy about  “aiming at”  the reduction of the  transaction costs 
automatically  entails  the  problem  of  their  valuation  or  measurement,  at  least  for 
distinguishing  among  the  viability  of  certain  institutional  solutions.  But  beside  any 
constructivist  strategy,  the  mainstream  perspective  must  be  reconsidered  and 
complemented, in which the transaction costs are seen rather as obstacles against economic 
success than natural corollaries of human action and social interaction. 
 
That is why the integration of the transaction costs in the theory regarding the economic 
development would become more useful and also more coherent, through the conceptual 
delimitation between the market transaction costs, the existence of which in the human 
action field is natural, unavoidable to a certain extent, and the imposed transaction costs, 
the source of which is external to the social order of the market, being the result of the 
hierarchic structure of the political power, specific for the State institutional system. 
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